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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Lowder entered a conditional guilty plea to a drug offense, reserving his right to
appeal the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. On appeal, Mr. Lowder asserts
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, because there was no
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the van he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic
laws. Mr. Lowder contends that the plain language of LC. § 49-428(2) does not prohibit his
conduct of driving with the license plate securely shoved between the dashboard and the driver's
side of the windshield. The deputy saw the license plate once he got closer to Mr. Lowder's van.
Despite seeing the license plate, the deputy continued with the traffic stop. On appeal,
Mr. Lowder asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion because the deputy lacked
reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop upon seeing the requisite license plate.

He

further contends that the traffic law regulating license plates, LC. § 49-428(2), is void for
vagueness as applied to his conduct of driving in with the license plate securely shoved between
the dashboard and the windshield.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 5, 2019, during daylight hours, Deputy Chad Payne performed a traffic stop on a
van he had passed traveling the opposite direction on the highway. (9/9/19 Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7,
L.14.) Deputy Payne did not see a front license plate on the vehicle when it passed by him. 1
(9/9/19 Tr., p.8, Ls.5-18.) He stopped the van for an equipment violation-the van's license
plate was not attached to the front bumper of the vehicle. (9/9/19 Tr., p.7, L.8 - p.8, L.24.) He

1

Deputy Payne did not record the encounter, either by body camera or by dash camera, thus the
deputy's testimony can neither be confirmed nor challenged. (See 9/9/19 Tr., Exhibits.)

1

made contact with the driver, who identified himself as Thomas Lowder. (9/9/19 Tr., p.8, L.25 p.11, L.17.) Deputy Payne and Mr. Lowder discussed the van's front license plate, which was
wedged between the dash and the front window on the driver's side. (9/9/19 Tr., p.10, L.18 p.11, L.1 0; Defense Exh. 1. )2 Mr. Lowder was driving without a valid driver's license and had
an outstanding arrest warrant. (9/9/19 p.12, Ls.16-19.) When he was searched incident to his
arrest, the deputy located a red straw with residue and a baggie of a crystalline substance which
tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (9/9/19 Tr., p.12, Ls.20-25.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Mr. Lowder
committed one count of possession of methamphetamine and one count of misdemeanor driving
without privileges. (R., pp.18-19.) Thereafter, Mr. Lowder filed a Motion to Suppress and a
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.27-39.) He asserted that
he was unlawfully seized because there was a license plate secured between the dashboard and
the windshield of the van, it was not swinging and was twelve inches above the ground, thus, the
officer lacked probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. (R., pp.27, 33, 35-36.)

Alternatively,

Mr. Lowder asserted that, if the location of the license plate violated Idaho Code § 49-428, the
statute was unconstitutionally vague.

(R., pp.33, 36-38.)

Mr. Lowder filed an affidavit in

support of the motion, in which he averred that the license plate was displayed in the front
window in compliance with Idaho law. (R., pp.29-30.)
A hearing was held on Mr. Lowder's motion. (See 9/9/19 Tr.) A photograph of the
position of the front license plate was admitted during the hearing as Defense Exhibit 1. (9/9/19
Tr., p.28, Ls.13-23.) In addition to the photograph, the district court heard testimony from
2

Mr. Lowder's father owned the van. After Mr. Lowder was arrested, his father came to the
impound and drove the van away. (9/9/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.3-24.) He was in a traffic accident later
that day, and the photograph admitted as Defense Exhibit 1 was taken after the accident, but the
same day Mr. Lowder was stopped by Deputy Payne. (9/9/19 Tr., p.18, L.4-p.19, L.15.)
2

Deputy Payne and Mr. Lowder. (9/9/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-25; p.16, L.14 - p.35, L.2.) Mr. Lowder
testified that the plate was secure in its location, it was "shoved down into the window in
between the window and the dash," and the plate was not moving. (9/9/19 Tr., p.33, L.2 - p.34,
L.15.) Defense counsel asserted that the location of the license plate complied with Idaho Code;
thus, there was no basis to justify the stop. (9/9/19 Tr., p.35, Ls.6-11.) Alternatively, defense
counsel argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because the language "securely
fastened" is described as "to prevent from swinging," while the case law provides that "a
swinging license plate is in fact illegal even if one part of it is securely fastened." (9/9/19
Tr., p.35, Ls.11-22.)
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Mr. Lowder's motion to
suppress finding that the initial contact was lawful based on probable cause that Mr. Lowder
committed an equipment violation due to the position of his license plate. (9/9/19 Tr., p.39, L.7
-p.40, L.14.)
The district court concluded:
The Court has considered this matter. The parties cited to a recent appellate court
decision in Idaho that found the requirements of the temporary permit statute to be
void for vagueness as applied in that case. And even though the permit in that case
was not in the ordinary place that the officer believed it would be, because of the
ambiguous and vagueness of the statute, it couldn't be applied in that case. And the
case then -- the appellate court said the motion to suppress should be granted in that
case.
However, the statute regarding the placement of the front license plate requires that
the plate be secured to the front of a vehicle, be securely attached to the front of the
vehicle visible from 75 feet from the front. It doesn't say where the plate should be
attached, but it does require that it be securely attached.
In this case the plate was tucked into between the dash and the windshield. The fact
of tucking in, that into, if you look at Exhibit 1 that has been admitted, frankly it
obscures a substantial portion of the license plate. It's not clear from Exhibit 1
whether it could be viewed. But in any event, it was not securely attached in the

3

Court's opinion. And the Court also concludes that at least from Exhibit 1 it's not
clearly visible from at least 75 foot in front of it.
That being said, this Court is going to -- the statute did not comply with Idaho's
requirement to have a front license place. The Court is going to deny defendant's
motion to suppress. Order of denial is entered.
(9/9/19 Tr., p.39, L.7 - p.40, L.14.) The court entered an order denying the motion to suppress.
(R., pp.63-64.)

Mr. Lowder entered a guilty plea, pursuant to a plea agreement, preserving his right to
appeal the denial of his suppression motion. (10/7/19 Tr., p.8, L16 - p.10, L.4; p.11, L.24 p.12, L.11; R., pp.47-48.) The district court sentenced Mr. Lowder to three years, with one year
fixed, and placed him on probation for three years.

(1/13/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.14-18; Supp.

R., pp.11-14.) Mr. Lowder filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment
and Commitment and Order of Probation. (R., pp.65-67; Supp. R., pp.11-14.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lowder's motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lowder's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Lowder contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because

Deputy Payne did not have reasonable suspicion to continue the traffic stop once he saw that the
front license plate on Mr. Lowder' s van was secured and was clearly visible. Thus, there was no
reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr. Lowder's van was being driven contrary to traffic
laws.

Alternatively, Mr. Lowder argues the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress because the traffic law at issue, LC. § 49-428(2), is unconstitutionally vague as applied
to his conduct. Under either argument, the district court should have suppressed any evidence
obtained from the unlawful traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014); State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App.
2013). The Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact "unless they are clearly erroneous."

Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also Ellis,
155 Idaho at 587. "At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court."

Ellis, 155 Idaho at 587. The Court "exercises free review over the application and construction
of statutes." State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct. App. 2015). Likewise, determinations of

6

reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.

State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013).

Constitutional questions are also reviewed de novo. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 377 (2013).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lowder's Motion To Suppress Because
Deputy Payne Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion For The Traffic Stop Once He Saw
The Securely Placed And Visible Front License Plate
Mr. Lowder complied with the officer's directive to stop and pulled his van to the side of

the road. (9/9/19 Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.9, L.1.) However, the stop constituted a seizure in violation
of Mr. Lowder's Fourth Amendment rights as it was not supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.; Idaho
Const. art. I, § 17.

Evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional right is generally

inadmissible against the accused as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
A traffic stop by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 & n.1, 653 (1979). A traffic stop is akin to a limited
investigative detention and analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Determining whether an
investigative detention is reasonable involves a dual inquiry into whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place.

State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 614

(Ct. App. 2014).
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An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
which justify reasonable suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged
in criminal activity. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 26; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983
(Ct. App. 2003)). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate
possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is
being driven contrary to traffic laws. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981);

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. "Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and
the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112
(2013) (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). The State bears the burden of
proving that an investigatory stop or detention is based on reasonable suspicion and is limited in
its scope and duration to the issue being investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983). "In order to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified by a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the
person to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613,
615 (Ct. App. 1997).
Here, Mr. Lowder asserts there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the van
he occupied was being driven contrary to traffic laws, because the placement of the license plate
securely between the windshield and the dashboard complied with LC. § 49-428(2), the statute
used to justify reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

1.

The License Plate Was Secured "To The Vehicle To Which It Is Assigned To
Prevent The Plate From Swinging" In Compliance With The Statute

Idaho Code§ 49-428 states, in relevant part:
(1) License plates assigned to a motor vehicle shall be attached, one (1) in the
front and the other in the rear,
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(2) Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to
which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not less than
twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the plate, be in
a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from
foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible, and all registration
stickers shall be securely attached to the license plates and shall be displayed as
provided in section 49-443(4), Idaho Code.
Idaho Code § 49-428.
Deputy Payne, when asked if the plate was securely attached, responded, "It was simply
placed against the windshield and the dash." (9/9/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-25.) However, Mr. Lowder
testified, and Defense Exhibit 1 shows, that the plate was secure in its location, it was "shoved
down into the window in between the window and the dash," and the plate was not moving.
(9/9/19 Tr., p.33, L.2 - p.34, L.15.)

Defense counsel argued that the statute was

unconstitutionally vague because the language "securely fastened" is described as "to prevent
from swinging" while the case law provides that "a swinging license plate is in fact illegal even
if one part of it is securely fastened." 3 (9/9/19 Tr., p.35, Ls.11-22.)
The district court concluded:
However, the statute regarding the placement of the front license plate requires that
the plate be secure to the front of a vehicle, be securely attached to the front of the
vehicle visible from 75 feet from the front. It doesn't say where the plate should be
attached, but it does require that it be securely attached.
In this case the plate was tucked into between the dash and the windshield. The fact
of tucking in, that into, if you look at Exhibit 1 that has been admitted, frankly it
obscures a substantial portion of the license plate. It's not clear from Exhibit 1
whether it could be viewed. But in any event, it was not securely attached in the
Court's opinion.
(9/9/19 Tr., p.39, L.18 -p.40, L.7.)
3

Counsel was referring to State v. Martin, a case in which the Idaho Court of Appeals
determined that a dangling license plate provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
support traffic stop. 148 Idaho 31, 35 (Ct. App. 2009).
9

In Martin, the defendant's license plate was fastened in only one place, causing the plate
to hang down at a thirty degree angle. 148 Idaho at 34. Mr. Martin asserted that the statute was
void for vagueness because the statute failed to define how a license plate is to be "securely
fastened to the vehicle." Id. He maintained that the Idaho Legislature could have meant that the
plate was either prohibited from:
perpendicular to the ground. Id.

(1) swinging parallel to the ground, or (2) swinging
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that statutory language

requiring license plates to be "securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent
the plate from swinging" clearly and unambiguously required the plate be securely fastened to
prevent any manner of swinging and, therefore, the statute was not unconstitutionally void. Id.
148 Idaho at 36. The Court held that the statute clearly set forth the conduct prohibited and
therefore was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Id.
Mr. Lowder asserts that he complied with LC. § 49-428(2) because his front license plate
was secured and was not swinging in any manner, the conduct prohibited by the statute. See
Martin, 148 Idaho at 36. Accordingly, under Martin, Mr. Lowder would have understood his

conduct to be in compliance with LC. § 49-428(2) where his license plate was tucked securelyit was not hanging down or swinging.
Furthermore, the van's license plate was a standard Department of Motor Vehicles-issued
license plate with current registration. (9/9/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Lowder shoved it, or
secured it to prevent it from swinging, in a visible location in his van, at a height not less than
twelve inches from the ground, in full compliance with the statute. (9/9/19 Tr., p.33, L.2 - p.34,
L.15; R., p.29; Defense Exh. 1.) The statute provides no notice that securing the plate in the
windshield would render the otherwise valid placement invalid. Although the Idaho Legislature
could certainly have required the license plates be "attached on or near the bumper of the

vehicle," it did not so word the statute to designate a location for the front license plate.
Mr. Lowder's conduct of driving with his license plate securely shoved between the windshield
and the dashboard (rendering incapable of swinging) was not a violation of LC. § 49-428(2).

2.

The License Plate Was "Clearly Visible" In Compliance With The Statute

The district court also concluded that, based on Exhibit 1, the license plate was "not
clearly visible from at least 75 foot in front of it." (9/9/19 Tr., p.40 Ls.7-9.) The court therefore
concluded that Mr. Lowder' s license plate did not comply with the statute and denied the motion
to suppress. (9/9/19 Tr., p.40, Ls.10-14.) However, the district court's finding that the license
plate pictured in Defense Exhibit 1 was not visible 75 feet away was a clearly erroneous finding
of fact. See Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418. Defense Exhibit 1 demonstrates that the license plate was
clearly visible 75 feet away.
Further, Mr. Lowder challenges the district court's analysis of the meaning of "clearly
visible" as applied to the front license plate. He contends that the district court erred by relying
on the language of LC. § 49-443(1 ), which governs the size of a license plate and requires license
plates to "be of sufficient size to be plainly readable from a distance of seventy-five (75) feet
during daylight." LC. § 49-443(1 ). The plain language of LC. § 49-428 says nothing about the
distance from which the plate must be visible to another. It requires the license plate to "be in a
place and position to be clearly visible." LC. § 49-428(2) (emphasis added).
Mr. Lowder's license plate was a regulation-issue, standard-sized plate. (9/9/19 Tr., p.15,
Ls.6-15.) He did not change the size of the license plate which would have implicated LC. § 49443(1)'s requirement that it be of a size to be plainly readable 75 feet away. The location of the
license plate, at issue here, did not change the size of the license plate. Where LC. § 49-443 does
not provide a definition of the terms "clearly visible," the district court erred by interpreting the

11

applicable statute, LC. § 49-428, as requiring the plate to be clearly visible from 75 feet away.
(9/9/19 Tr., p.40, Ls.7-9.) Because LC. § 49-443 only governs the size of the license plate and
requires it to be "plainly readable" from seventy-five feet away, this statute is inapplicable here.
The statute Mr. Lowder was charged with violating does not include "plainly readable"
requirements. The district court's reliance on the language of LC. § 49-443 when interpreting
the meanings of the terms "clearly visible" in LC. § 49-428(2) was error. (See 9/9/19 Tr., p.39,
L.18 - p.40, L.9.) If the Idaho Legislature intended to require more than "clearly visible," such
as visibility from a certain distance, the legislature must add that language to the statute.
The Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of "clearly visible" in State v.
Tregeagle:

We conclude the pertinent language of LC. § 49-428(2) is unambiguous. A plain
reading of the statute indicates a license plate must be in a place and a position to
be clearly visible. Visible means "capable of being seen," "perceptible by vision,"
"easily seen." Webster's Third New Int'l. Diet. 2557 (3d ed. 1993). Clearly means
"in a clear manner," "without doubt or question." Id. As such, a license plate
mounted in a place that results in it being partially obstructed from view by a
trailer ball hitch violates the "clearly visible" requirement of LC. § 49-428(2).
161 Idaho 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding defendant's trailer ball hitch partially obstructed
her rear license plate, a violation of LC. § 49-428(2)). The district court erred by failing to apply
controlling precedent to determine the meaning of "clearly visible."

The district court's

definition of "clearly visible" goes well beyond the statute's plain language. "Statutory
interpretation begins with the statute's plain language. That language is to be given its plain,
obvious and rational meaning. If that language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely
apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction." State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189,
191 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, two words at issue are "clearly" and
"visible."

12

The court must interpret "the literal words of the statute." State v. Garner, 161 Idaho
708, 710 (2017) (quoting State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999)). Accordingly, visibility
refers to the ability to see the license plate, while readable refers to the information on the license
plate.

These words-legible, readable, and visible-have distinct meanings and cannot be

interchanged in the statute's plain language interpretation. Therefore, Mr. Lowder's license plate
was "in a place and position to be clearly visible," in compliance with LC. § 49-428(2).

3.

Once Deputy Payne Saw Mr. Lowder's Secured And Clearly Visible Front
License Plate, He No Longer Had Authority For The Seizure Because His
Reasonable Suspicion Was Dispelled

Under the plain language interpretation of LC. § 49-428(2), Mr. Lowder's front license
plate was secured between the windshield and the dashboard and because the plate was "clearly
visible. Because Mr. Lowder complied with the statute, Deputy Payne no longer had a lawful
basis to continue the traffic stop once he saw the front license plate in Mr. Lowder's van.
Here, the presence of Mr. Lowder's front license plate dispelled Deputy Payne's
reasonable suspicion for an equipment violation.

A traffic stop may "last no longer than

necessary to effectuate" the stop's purpose. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S.
at 500 (plurality opinion)).

Once Deputy Payne saw the license plate on Mr. Lowder's

dashboard, Deputy Payne no longer had authority for the seizure. See State v. Salois, 144 Idaho
344, 348 (Ct. App. 2007); see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 ("Authority for the seizure thus
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have beencompleted."); State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016) (same). The license
plate was secured and clearly visible.

Deputy Payne lacked reasonable suspicion to detain

Mr. Lowder once he saw the front license plate and therefore the prolonged seizure was unlawful
under the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608.
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The evidence obtained from Deputy Payne's investigation "would not have come to light
but for the government's unconstitutional conduct" in prolonging the traffic stop without
reasonable suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005). Due to the
unlawfully prolonged stop, Mr. Lowder submits that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence

obtained through unconstitutional police conduct subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at
810-11 (same).

D.

Alternatively, The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Lowder's Motion To
Suppress Because LC. § 49-428(2) Is Unconstitutionally Vague As Applied To
Mr. Lowder's Conduct
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001). This "doctrine requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted).
"The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other
principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement."' Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
"Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may
permit a 'standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections."' Id.

(quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).

"Legislatures may not so

abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law." Smith, 415 U.S. at
575. Rather, the "absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely
what offends the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578 (citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void
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for vagueness when it subjects a person "to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that
police, court, and jury [are] free to react to nothing more than their own preferences .... " Id.
A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a
defendant's conduct. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003), abrogated on other grounds
by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013). To succeed in making an as applied challenge, a
defendant "must show that he did not receive fair notice from the statute and interpretive case
law that his particular conduct was punishable." State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 123 (2002)
(citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-57 (1974)).
In State v. Cook, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the statute
governing a driver's temporary permit:
This Court has held that when an agency is tasked with the responsibility of
providing adequate guidance to warn individuals that specific conduct would be
subject to punishment, yet fails to do so, the underlying statute may be found
unconstitutionally vague as applied to that specific conduct. H & V Eng 'g, Inc. v.
Idaho State Bd. of Prof'! Engineers & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 650, 747
P.2d 55, 59 (1987). Accordingly, without clear guidance from the Board or the
statute on whether the permit need only be readily legible at the time of posting or
whether the permit had to be readable from some distance away, it is impossible
for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand that she had not complied with
the statute despite posting a valid permit where statutorily directed. Likewise, it
was reasonable for Cook to understand she had complied with the statute when:
she posted a valid permit that was issued to her, the permit was posted in her rear
windshield and was visible and readable when posted, and the permit remained in
that location while her vehicle was operated on the highway.
165 Idaho 305, 311 (2019).
Here, Mr. Lowder asserts that LC. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
his conduct. Idaho Code § 49-428(2)'s requirement of a "clearly visible" license plate that must
"be securely fastened" in order "to prevent the plate from swinging" is unconstitutionally vague
as applied. First, the statute failed to provide Mr. Lowder with fair notice that his conduct was
proscribed. Mr. Lowder obtained a license plate and current registration tab, and secured it in a
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visible location in the van, in full compliance with the statute. (9/9/19 Tr., p.33, L.2 - p.34,
L.15; Defense Exh. 1.) Due to the deputy's arbitrary and subjective view, which was out of
Mr. Lowder's control, he was suddenly in violation of the law. He had no way to prevent this
violation (since he only had zip ties, which may result in a swinging license plate even when
attached to a bumper) or even to know the violation was occurring (since the statute does not
require him to affix the license plate to a bumper). As applied to Mr. Lowder's conduct of
driving with his license plate securely shoved between the windshield and the dashboard
(rendering incapable of swinging) I.C. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague because it does
not give fair notice that an officer's subjective opinion that the license plate was not "securely
fastened" "to prevent the plate from swinging" will render a validly placed license plate invalid
and cause the driver to violate a traffic law.
Further, the statute provides no notice that an external factor, such as glare from the sun,
would render the otherwise valid license plate invalid. Owing solely to arbitrary and subjective
view by the officer, which was out of Mr. Lowder's control, he was suddenly in violation of the
law. He had no way to prevent this violation (since the license plate was a standard-issue plate
from the Department of Motor Vehicles (9/9/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-15)) or even to know the
violation was occurring (since he would see the properly displayed license plate in his
windshield and had no way to see his license plate from another vantage point while driving past
his vehicle in the opposite direction). As applied to Mr. Lowder's conduct of driving with a
license plate clearly visible through the windshield, LC. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague
because it does not give fair notice that an officer's subjective opinion that the license plate was
not "clearly visible" will render a valid license plate invalid and cause the driver to violate a
traffic law.
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Second, LC. § 49-428(2) failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police have
unbridled discretion in determining whether to cite Mr. Lowder for the equipment violation. As
applied here, the police can detain a person and cite him or her for a violation of this traffic law
based on the sun's reflection of the windshield or the officer's own opinion that, should there be
a vehicle accident, the license plate might shift. (See 9/9/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-13 (Deputy Payne
speculating that if Mr. Lowder had been in an accident, the license plate could have come
loose.)) As such, the sun's glare or even the officer's poor eyesight would transform a secured
and clearly visible license plate into one which violates Idaho law. One can imagine that a police
officer, wanting to detain certain drivers, could simply wait for the right weather conditions and
then initiate the traffic stop.

A violation of this traffic law is vested solely in the officer's

discretion and whether he or she, subjectively at the time, believed the license place inside the
windshield was "clearly visible" and whether, in that officer's opinion, the license plate was
secured. As applied, LC. § 49-428(2) invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
In summary, LC. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Lowder under
either test-it failed to provide him with fair notice that driving with a license plate securely
shoved (rendering incapable of swinging) in the front of the windshield would be proscribed
conduct, and it failed to provide any guidelines to restrain the police's discretion in determining
whether a plate was "clearly visible." Because Mr. Lowder's conduct of displaying a front
license plate secured between the windshield and the dashboard complied with LC. § 49-428(2)
the district court erred when it denied Mr. Lowder's motion to suppress.
Because LC. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied, the district court erred
when it denied Mr. Lowder's motion to suppress on void for vagueness grounds.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Lowder respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court's
order denying his motion to suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand his case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2020.
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